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In December 2009, two unusual cases of anthrax were 
diagnosed in heroin users in Scotland. A subsequent anthrax 
outbreak in heroin users emerged throughout Scotland and 
expanded into England and Germany, sparking concern 
of nefarious introduction of anthrax spores into the heroin 
supply. To better understand the outbreak origin, we used 
established genetic signatures that provided insights about 
strain origin. Next, we sequenced the whole genome of a 
representative Bacillus anthracis strain from a heroin user 
(Ba4599), developed Ba4599-specifi c single-nucleotide 
polymorphism assays, and genotyped all available material 
from other heroin users with anthrax. Of 34 case-patients with 
B. anthracis–positive PCR results, all shared the Ba4599 
single-nucleotide polymorphism genotype. Phylogeographic 
analysis demonstrated that Ba4599 was closely related to 
strains from Turkey and not to previously identifi ed isolates 
from Scotland or Afghanistan, the presumed origin of the 
heroin. Our results suggest accidental contamination along 
the drug traffi cking route through a cutting agent or animal 
hides used to smuggle heroin into Europe.
Bacillus anthracis is a gram-positive endospore-forming bacterium that causes the disease anthrax 
in livestock, wildlife, and humans. Because of its hardy 
spores, B. anthracis can survive for extended periods in the 
environment, a trait that likely contributed to the successful 
global spread of this organism (1). The mostly dormant life 
cycle of B. anthracis and its relatively recent emergence as 
a pathogen have resulted in a genome that is highly clonal, 
with little genetic variation among even the most distantly 
related strains (2–4).
Anthrax is most commonly contracted by exposure 
to contaminated animal products, such as skins, wool, 
or meat; its symptoms vary in severity depending on the 
route of infection. Cutaneous anthrax, the most common 
manifestation of disease, accounts for 95% of cases, 
whereas pulmonary and gastrointestinal anthrax are much 
less common and follow inhalation or ingestion of spores, 
respectively. Inhalational anthrax is rare but particularly 
deadly, with up to a 90% fatality rate (5).
In 2000, a novel form of cutaneous anthrax, termed 
injectional anthrax, was proposed after anthrax was 
diagnosed in a heroin “skin popper” (one who injects 
the drug beneath the skin, rather than into a vein) from 
Norway on postmortem examination (6). Injectional 
anthrax symptoms are more severe than those of cutaneous 
anthrax and are typifi ed by severe soft tissue infection 
at the injection site, which can progress to septic shock, 
meningitis, and death (7). The origin of anthrax in the 
Norwegian heroin user was never identifi ed, although 
contaminated heroin was suspected (6). This case was the 
fi rst to demonstrate this previously unrecognized route of 
B. anthracis infection.
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In December 2009, two cases of injectional anthrax 
were diagnosed in heroin users in Scotland after B. anthracis 
was detected in blood cultures (8). These cases marked the 
beginning of an emerging anthrax outbreak among European 
heroin users. Over the following months, 14 anthrax deaths 
were confi rmed and 119 anthrax cases were suspected (9), 
leading to increasing media attention as the severity of this 
outbreak became more apparent. This attention was spurred 
by 3 factors. First, B. anthracis is not found naturally in 
Scotland, and human cases of anthrax in Europe are extremely 
rare, with only 3 cases of anthrax notifi ed in Europe in 
2008 (10). Second, the pathology of injectional anthrax is 
especially devastating (11,12). Third, anthrax cases appeared 
to befall only an ostensibly targeted population of persons, 
leading to initial suggestions of deliberate contamination of 
the heroin supply. Although investigations were unable to 
show nefarious intent, the mode of contamination with B. 
anthracis spores remained elusive because of an inability to 
culture B. anthracis from, or detect B. anthracis DNA in, 
suspected contaminated heroin (9).
In the current study, we applied a molecular 
phylogeographic approach to identify the likely origin 
of the B. anthracis spores responsible for the 2009–2010 
outbreak in Europe. We used canonical single-nucleotide 
polymorphism (canSNP) genotyping against heroin anthrax 
samples and an extensive collection of diverse worldwide 
samples (1,13) and whole genome sequencing techniques 
to determine a possible origin for the B. anthracis spores 
responsible for this outbreak.
Materials and Methods
B. anthracis–containing Heroin Samples 
We obtained 36 samples, positive for B. anthracis by 
culture or PCR, from 34 injecting heroin users throughout 
the duration of the epidemic (December 2009–November 
2010) (Table). Most samples were from users in Scotland 
(n = 29), with 5 samples from England, 1 sample from 
Germany, and 1 sample of unknown origin.
DNA Extraction
A B. anthracis isolate obtained from a Scottish heroin 
user in December 2009 (Ba4599) was cultured for 18 hours 
on 5% sheep blood agar, and genomic DNA was obtained by 
using phenol/chloroform extraction. All other B. anthracis 
isolates obtained during the outbreak were extracted by 
using a QIAamp DNA Mini Kit (QIAGEN, Valencia, 
CA, USA). We extracted 337  geographically diverse B. 
anthracis isolates from the Trans-Eurasian (TEA) group of 
the B. anthracis phylogeny (1,4,15) by using 5% Chelex 
100 (Bio-Rad, Hercules, CA, USA) (16). Strains for whole 
genome sequencing were extracted by using the DNeasy 
Blood and Tissue kit (QIAGEN).
SNP Genotyping
Several previously established canSNP real-time 
PCR assays for B. anthracis were used to determine the 
approximate phylogenetic placement of Ba4599 on the 
B. anthracis phylogenetic tree (1,15,17). This approach 
enabled us to identify a subset of isolates that matched 
the Ba4599 genotype according to canSNP genotyping. 
Novel assays within the A.Br.008/009 group were then 
run against Ba4599 and other A.Br.008/009 samples in 
our collection to refi ne the phylogenetic placement of 
Ba4599 within A.Br.008/009 and to identify its closest 
known relatives.
To divide the A.Br.008/009 TEA group into 2 
lineages (A.Br.008/011 and A.Br.011/009; Figure), 
we converted the canSNP A.Br.011 assay (17) into 
a TaqMan MGB dual-probe real-time PCR (Applied 
Biosystems, Foster City, CA, USA). These A.Br.011 
primers and probes (5′ → 3′) were used: ABr011_For: 
CTAAAAAGAAACGAATTCCCGCTGA, ABr011_Rev: 
CGATAAAAATCGGAATTGAAGCAGGAG, ABr011_
Anc: VIC-CGCCCCCATTATTT, and ABr011_Der: 
6-FAM-CGCCCCTATTATTT. The SNP position is 
underlined in the TaqMan probe sequences.
The B. anthracis isolate from heroin and 114 other 
isolates from our collection clustered within the A.Br.008/011 
lineage. We therefore focused on further resolving the 
positions of members of this group. Comparison of the 
A0897 genome (see below) with previously published 
genomes (1,3) yielded 67 SNPs within this lineage (Figure). 
Three of these SNPs were incorporated into allele-specifi c 
real-time PCR assays (18) and used to reduce the list of 
closest relatives to Ba4599 (Figure). The A.Br.008/011 
SNP assays are named according to their location on the 
Ames Ancestor chromosome (GenBank accession no. 
AE017334) and are listed in order of increasing proximity 
to the terminal genome on this branch, B. anthracis 
strain A0897. Primers for these 3 A.Br.008/011 lineage 
SNPs are shown in 5′ → 3′ orientation and as ancestral, 
derived, and common primers, respectively: SNP5013862 
(ATTGAAATGATGATTTTTCACgA, GATTGAAATGA
TGATTTTTCACgT, TGGTTTATACCATTGTATTGC
CCG), SNP1967560 (AATCATCAACATGGTCTTC
TGTAAaC, AATCATCAACATGGTCTTCTGTAAgA, 
GAAAAACCAGAAGTAGTGTGCGGTG), and 
SNP1118831 (CTCGCTCTGCGTACGTTTG, CTCGCT
CTGCGTACGTTcA, TATCAATCTGAAGAAGGTAGC
GATAACG). Underlined nucleotides indicate the SNP 
position, and lowercase nucleotides indicate deliberately 
incorporated penultimate mismatches for enhanced allele 
specifi city (19). These 3 SNPs grouped 2 samples (A0149 
and A0264) from our collection with Ba4599.
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Whole Genome Sequencing 
We sequenced 3 genomes (Ba4599, A0897, and A0149) 
to place Ba4599 into a broader phylogenetic context and to 
accurately establish the evolutionary relationships among 
these strains. We also sought to identify heroin strain–
specifi c SNPs that could be used to rapidly determine 
whether B. anthacis that caused infections in heroin users 
was from the same point source as Ba4599. Because of the 
highly clonal nature of B. anthracis and its low mutation 
rate, phylogenetic analysis using small numbers of SNPs 
derived from whole genome sequencing is a highly accurate 
method for determining qualitative and quantitative 
patterns of relatedness (3,20). With the exception of A0149 
and previously sequenced strains, isolates were subjected 
to paired-end whole genome sequencing on the Illumina 
Genome Analyzer IIx instrument (Illumina Inc., San 
Diego, CA, USA). Additional sequencing was performed 
for Ba4599 on the 454 GS FLX instrument (454 Life 
Sciences, Branford, CT, USA) to provide complementary 
validation of whole genome sequencing SNP calls and 
improve contiguity of the genome assembly. De novo 
hybrid assembly of the Ba4599 Illumina and 454 data was 
performed by using Celera Assembler version 6.1 (21). 
Ba4599 contigs are available in DDBJ/EMBL/GenBank 
(accession no. AGQP00000000 and AGQP01000000).
A0149 was sequenced with a shotgun Sanger 
library approach by using pUC19 and M13 reads before 
electrophoresis on an AB3730xl instrument (Applied 
Biosystems). Read mapping was performed by using BWA 
and BWA-SW 0.5.9 (22,23). Ames Ancestor (GenBank 
accession nos. AE017334–AE017336) was used as the 
reference genome for assembly and WesternNA USA6153 
(GenBank accession no. AAER00000000) as a related but 
distinct genome for the TEA group. Processing and data 
fi ltering were performed with SAMtools 0.1.12a (24) 
by using an in-house java script that fi ltered out results, 
providing <10× coverage. For in-house genomes, SNP 
calls were then made by using SolSNP version 1.1 with 
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Table. Genotyping results of 36 culture- or PCR-confirmed cases of anthrax in heroin users, 2009–2010, Europe* 
Sample  no. Status† Collection date Location SNP1053700 SNP1173928 
Ames‡ NA 1981 Texas, USA A G 
Ba4599§ C+/PCR+ 2009 Dec 16 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
A112 C+/PCR+ 2009 Dec 18 Germany G C 
4622 C+/PCR+ 2009 Dec 19 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
4646 C-/PCR+ 2009 Dec 22 Airdrie, Scotland G C 
4670 C+/PCR+ 2009 Dec 23 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
4745 C-/PCR+ 2009 Dec 31 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0002 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 4 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0007 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 4 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0001 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 4 Dundee, Scotland G C 
0046 C-/PCR+ 2010 Jan 6 Stirling, Scotland G C 
0074 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 7 Kirkcaldy, Scotland G C 
0075 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 7 Kirkcaldy, Scotland G C 
0117(2) C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 9 Dundee, Scotland G C 
0142 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 9 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0271 C-/PCR+ 2010 Jan 15 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0393 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 20 Kilmarnock, Scotland G C 
0426 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 21 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0491 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jan 22 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0773 C+/PCR+ 2010 Feb 4 London, England G C 
0871 C+/PCR+ 2010 Feb 9 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0874 C+/PCR+ 2010 Feb 9 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
0844 C-/PCR+ 2010 Feb 9 Blackpool, England G C 
1297 C+/PCR+ 2010 Feb 26 London, England G C 
1060 C+/PCR+ 2010 Mar 5 Fife, Scotland G C 
1134 C+/PCR+ 2010 Mar 5 Dumfries, Scotland G C 
1320 C+/PCR+ 2010 Mar 5 Dumfries, Scotland G C 
0981 C-/PCR+ 2010 Mar 5 Airdrie, Scotland G C 
1458 C-/PCR+ 2010 Apr 1 Dumfries, Scotland G C 
1927 C-/PCR+ 2010 Apr 1 Paisley, Scotland G C 
2145 C-/PCR+ 2010 Apr 16 Livingston, Scotland G C 
2199 C-/PCR+ 2010 Apr 16 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
2506 C+/PCR+ 2010 Apr 27 Edinburgh, Scotland G C 
2728 C+/PCR+ 2010 May 7 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
3739 C+/PCR+ 2010 Jul 16 Glasgow, Scotland G C 
4936/5011 C-/PCR+ 2010 Aug 26 Leicester, England G C 
6696 C+/PCR+ 2010 Nov 1 Maidstone, England G C 
*ID, identification; SNP, single nucleotide polymorphism; NA, not applicable; C, culture. Boldface indicates pairs of isolates from the same patient. 
†PCR+ samples were determined by using assays targeting cap, lef (Special Pathogens Reference Unit (UK), pers. comm.) and bagC loci (14).
‡Ancestral allele DNA control. 
§Derived allele DNA control. 
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the following alignment limits: minimum coverage of 20, 
minimum mapping qualities of 20, and a fi lter call of 0.95. 
MUMmer 3.20 (25) was used to determine SNP calls in 
public genome sequences.
Whole Genome Phylogenetic Analysis
Maximum-parsimony phylogenetic trees were inferred 
by conducting a heuristic search in PAUP* 4.0b10 (26) by 
using the fi ltered whole genome sequencing SNP data as 
input. The tree was rooted by using Ames Ancestor as the 
outgroup because this strain is not a descendant of the TEA 
group.
Phylogenetic Placement of Nearest Neighbors
We did not have whole genome sequencing data for isolate 
A0264 from Turkey. We therefore used canSNP genotyping 
assays to determine the approximate phylogenetic location 
of this strain relative to Ba4599 and A0149. CanSNPs along 
the branch leading to A0149 and Ba4599 were identifi ed 
from whole genome sequencing data by searching for SNPs 
with allelic states shared only between these 2 genomes. We 
designed assays for 3 of these SNPs (Figure). The positions 
of these SNPs in the Ames Ancestor genome (NC_007530.2) 
are listed along with fl anking sequence from Ames 
Ancestor. The SNP is underlined and the derived allele, 
found in Ba4599, is included in parentheses: SNP1530761 
GGGCATTAGGATCAGCGATAA (T), SNP3287006 
AGGTTGCCTTCCCCATCTATT (A), and SNP3836105 
AATCGTAAAGTGGCTGTATTT (C). Primers for the fi rst 
SNP (1530761) assay are listed in order of derived, ancestral, 
and common primers as follows (5′ → 3′): SNP1530761 
(CTACTGCTTCTTACACATTTATCGCTGtA, TACTGC
TTCTTACACATTTATCGCTGtT, GTTCCGCTCGGTA
CGGTATC). This assay was the most robust of the 3 tested 
assays.
We then used whole genome comparisons to identify 
SNPs along the branch leading to the Ba4599 genome. These 
SNPs were tested against A0264 and all 36 clinical samples 
from the heroin outbreak. We targeted 2 of the 13 identifi ed 
SNPs (Figure) for TaqMan assay design as follows: 
SNP1053700 (CCTCGGAAATGAAGTGGTTGAAAAT, 
CGGGAATGTTGACATTAAGCTCATT, VIC-CTGCA
TAAATACCAGATAGTAA, FAM-CTGCATAAATACC
AGGTAGTAA) and SNP1173928 (GCAGGTCTTCGA
ATGATGTGTCAAT, GCTCTTCCACGATTTCAAAG
TCATT, VIC-CCTGTTGTAGAATATCT, FAM-CTGT
TGTACAATATCT). Ninety-three TEA isolates unrelated 
to the heroin outbreak and 2 non-TEA isolates belonging 
to the Ames (A0462) and Western North America (A0303) 
groups were screened to confi rm specifi city of these 2 SNP 
assays for the Ba4599 heroin genotype.
Results and Discussion
Phylogeographic Placement of B. anthracis 
Heroin Strain Ba4599
Anthrax is considered to be endemic to many parts of 
western, central and southern Asia, with large numbers of 
human and animal anthrax cases being reported annually 
in countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkey, and the 
Republic of Georgia. Molecular epidemiologic studies of 
B. anthracis have demonstrated that particular genotypes 
correspond with geographic regions, a trait made possible 
by the relatively recent emergence of this highly clonal 
pathogen (1,3,4). Therefore, by establishing the genotype 
of Ba4599, we expected to fi nd clues regarding the 
geographic origin of the anthrax outbreak caused by 
contaminated heroin.
Afghanistan produces 90% of the world’s heroin (27), 
and the Khyber Pass region of Pakistan and Afghanistan 
has historically been one of the major centers for staging 
and traffi cking of heroin into western Europe (28). It was 
therefore logical to suspect that heroin traffi cked into 
Europe during the 2009–2010 anthrax epidemic originated 
in Afghanistan, having become contaminated at the primary 
source (7). Indeed, some media reports speculated that the 
potential source of anthrax spores in the heroin supply was 
a cutting agent derived from B. anthracis–infected Afghan 
livestock (29).
We sought to phylogenetically place the representative 
Ba4599 heroin isolate by using previously established 
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Figure. Phylogenetic location of the heroin Ba4599 genome on 
the global Bacillus anthracis phylogenetic tree (1). Ba4599 was 
isolated from a heroin user who died of anthrax at the beginning 
of the 2009–2010 European anthrax outbreak. Canonical single 
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) typing situated Ba4599 within the 
A.Br.008/011 clade of the Trans-Eurasian group (arrows). Closer 
examination of the boxed area (inset) revealed that Ba4599 
was closely related to 2 isolates from Turkey, A0149 and A0264. 
Solid black circles indicate the approximate position of collapsed 
branches (n = 3) and are labeled with the corresponding number 
of strains that fall within the node. Branch termini are occupied 
by whole genome sequenced strains (black stars). SNPs are 
numbered on a given branch; vertical bars along the A.Br.008/011 
branches denote the phylogenetic placement of SNP assays 
used in our analysis of B. anthracis from heroin users in Europe. 
Consistency index = 0.923.
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(1,15) and novel canSNP signatures, thereby pinpointing 
the potential geographic origin of contamination. Our 
canSNP typing grouped Ba4599 within the A.Br.008/011 
node of the TEA group (Figure). TEA strains are the most 
common and widespread group of B. anthracis in the 
world, being found in Europe, the People’s Republic of 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and West Africa (1). Seventeen 
recent isolates from animals in Afghanistan were analyzed 
and proved not to be members of TEA but rather were 
affi liated with the evolutionarily distinct Vollum clade. 
These results are inconsistent with the conclusion that 
heroin became contaminated during primary production 
and transformation of opium in Afghanistan.
Precise source attribution of the outbreak caused by B. 
anthracis–contaminated heroin is complicated by the wide 
phylogeographic spread of the TEA group. To improve 
phylogenetic resolution and to deduce the closest relatives 
of Ba4599, we identifi ed and characterized additional 
molecular targets within the A.Br.008/011 group (SNPs 
5013862, 1967560, and 1118831). Ba4599 has derived 
alleles for the fi rst 2 SNPs but an ancestral allele for 
1118831; we were therefore interested in identifying 
other strains with the same canSNP profi le as Ba4599. We 
tested these 3 SNP signatures across all 120 A.Br.008/011 
strains within our B. anthracis collection, comprising 
isolates from Albania (n = 5), Argentina (1), Austria (1), 
China (47), Ethiopia (1), Hungary (3), Iran (1), Italy (21), 
Norway (1), Pakistan (2), Poland (1), Republic of Georgia 
(5), Russia (2), Scotland (12), Slovakia (2), Turkey (6), 
Ukraine (1), or unknown origin (8). Notably, Ba4599 was 
indistinguishable from only 2 isolates, A0149 and A0264, 
both of which originated from Turkey. Twelve isolates 
linked to a fatal case of anthrax in a drum maker in Scotland 
in 2006, which originated from contaminated animal skins 
from Ghana, did not match the Ba4599 genotype. Similarly, 
the bioweaponized B. anthracis used on Gruinard Island, 
Scotland, during World War II (30) belongs to the unrelated 
Vollum clade and is thus distinct from Ba4599.
Differentiation of Ba4599 and Turk A0149 
Although Ba4599 and A0149 are closely related, they 
are not identical. By using whole genome sequencing, 
we identifi ed 51 SNPs that differentiated Ba4599 from 
A0149, of which 12 were unique to Ba4599 and 38 unique 
to A0149 (Figure). A second isolate from Turkey, A0264, 
was tested against 3 of the 10 SNPs leading to the A0149/
Ba4599 group (SNPs 1530761, 3836105, and 3287006) 
and the 2 Ba4599-specifi c SNPs (1173928 and 1053700) 
to approximate its phylogenetic location. Our analyses 
of SNPs 1530761, 3836105, and 3287006 revealed that 
A0264 shared the derived genotype with A0149 and 
Ba4599. In contrast, A0264 did not match the 2 SNPs 
along the Ba4599 branch, similarly to A0149 (Figure). 
Therefore, A0264 probably does not fall on the branch 
leading to Ba4599; however, precise placement would 
require assaying all 13 SNPs along the Ba4599 branch or 
whole genome sequencing of A0264. Four other isolates 
from Turkey in our collection fall on the A.Br.008/011 
branch but possess an ancestral allele for SNPs 1530761, 
3836105, and 3287006, and are thus not as closely related 
to Ba4599 as are A0149 and A0264.
Source Attribution of B. anthracis in Heroin 
On the basis of our molecular typing results, we 
strongly suspect that B. anthracis spores were accidentally 
introduced into the heroin supply in Turkey (or surrounding 
regions) before being smuggled into Europe. Heroin 
produced in Afghanistan is thought to be traffi cked through 
2 major routes: the Silk Route and, more commonly, the 
Balkan Route. Both of these routes pass through numerous 
countries where anthrax is endemic and where isolates 
belonging to the TEA group have been found. Although we 
were unable to exhaustively test B. anthracis isolates along 
these routes to fi nd a precise match to Ba4599, Turkey is 
defi nitely a possible origin, given that this country is central 
to the heroin smuggling trade from Afghanistan into Europe 
along the Balkan Route (31), and Turkish laboratories are 
believed to play a key role in conversion of the morphine 
base into its usable heroin form (32).
Thus, our genotyping results support the hypothesis 
that the heroin was contaminated along the traffi cking route 
and not at its origin (Afghanistan) or destination (Scotland). 
How it was contaminated is highly speculative, but it may 
have involved the addition of an animal-derived cutting 
agent, e.g., bone meal, or, alternately, wrapping in animal 
hide contaminated with B. anthracis spores. Contaminated 
animal hide products have been implicated in several 
allochthonous anthrax cases in Europe and the United 
States (33–38), including B. anthracis isolates from drum 
skins linked to a 2006 anthrax case in Scotland. Isolates in 
our collection from other countries along the Balkan and 
Silk Routes, including Albania, Hungary, Italy, Poland, 
Russia, and Ukraine, did not match the Ba4599 genotype, 
giving greater credence to our hypothesis of Turkey as the 
point of origin. However, we do not possess isolates from 
several other anthrax-endemic countries along the Silk and 
Balkan Routes and therefore cannot rule out the possibility 
of contamination elsewhere in the region.
Genotypes of Subsequent B. anthracis Isolates 
from Heroin Users 
Two Ba4599-specifi c SNP assays were used to rapidly 
screen 35 other B. anthracis–positive (by culture or PCR) 
samples from the heroin-associated outbreak, including 
an isolate obtained from a heroin user with anthrax in 
Germany (14). These 2 SNP assays were also screened 
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across a panel of 92 TEA and 2 non-TEA B. anthracis 
samples to determine assay specifi city. All outbreak 
isolates obtained for this study shared the 2-SNP Ba4599 
genotype, suggesting that the outbreak originated from a 
batch of heroin that was contaminated with B. anthracis 
spores from a single point source. In contrast, none of the 
nonoutbreak samples matched the Ba4599 genotype at 
either SNP, demonstrating that these SNPs were specifi c to 
Ba4599. The German patient had no history of travel to the 
United Kingdom, indicating acquisition of anthrax from a 
single batch of heroin that was disseminated to at least 3 
European countries (Scotland, England, and Germany). It 
is therefore possible that future cases of anthrax may arise, 
should the contaminated batch of heroin recirculate in the 
user population.
Conclusions
In this study, we used a high-resolution molecular 
epidemiologic approach to identify the geographic source 
of anthrax spores responsible for the largest outbreak of 
injectional anthrax observed to date. Using all available 
clinical material, we found that the 2009–2010 anthrax 
outbreak that affected heroin users across Scotland, 
Germany, and England was caused by a single anthrax 
strain. Further, genetic and genomic analyses demonstrated 
that the anthrax spores, while not an exact match, were 
most closely related to isolates from Turkey. Turkey is a 
central country along the Balkan Route, a common route for 
traffi cking heroin from its primary source in Afghanistan 
into European countries. Given the commonality of the 
TEA group throughout the world, and the close relationship 
of Ba4599 to isolates from Turkey, we do not possess any 
evidence to suggest that the heroin was contaminated 
with nefarious intent. Our results suggest accidental 
contamination from an animal-derived source, such as 
bone meal (a cutting agent used to dilute heroin) or animal 
hides. Although no new cases of injectional anthrax have 
been reported since a case was diagnosed in November 
2010 in Maidstone, England, this outbreak may indicate 
an emerging infectious disease in drug addicts in Europe 
and that illicit drugs such as heroin are a novel point of 
entry for this pathogen into non–anthrax-endemic regions. 
Educating users of the potential risks of acquiring anthrax 
from their drug use, coupled with maintained vigilance 
of public health investigators toward identifying anthrax 
cases, would help mitigate the public health effects of 
future outbreaks in this susceptible population.
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